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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to compare and contrast the philosophies of Martin Heidegger
and John Dewey regarding metaphysics and science. Concerning metaphysics, there are two
main areas of attention, the historical emergence of metaphysics in the philosophical tradition,
and the abandonment of the metaphysical notions of substance and subjectivity. After examining
these two areas of both thinkers’ philosophies, we then turn to their philosophy of science,
demonstrating how the metaphysical thought of both thinkers is inseparable from their
metaphysical critiques. For Heidegger, modern science is merely a continuation of the
metaphysics of the past, while for Dewey; science is the tool by which modern man can throw
off the false metaphysical assumptions of the past.
After demonstrating the metaphysical and scientific thought of both thinkers, both are
compared to one another, in an attempt to illuminate their similarities and differences, finally
concluding that if reconciliation is possible between Heidegger and Dewey, it is in their
environmental thought.
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INTRODUCTION
The sage-like question has been posed to me, is metaphysics even relevant any longer? It
is true that we, at least in academia, seem to occupy a post-metaphysical world. That no sane
individual would argue evolution is a result of an otherworldly control structure, guiding and
molding our world in such a way as to align its ends and purposes with some teleological cause
seems pretty certain. However, one should not be so quick to dismiss the prevalent metaphysical
beliefs in our society, particularly in the United States, in which those ignorantly guided by
groundless otherworldly dictates (i.e. religious fundamentalist) play a significant role in policy
making as well as setting social moiré’s and the cultural zeitgeist. Make no mistake about it,
metaphysics is alive and well in our society, being engaged everywhere from arguments for
creationism and anti-homosexual propaganda to economic and political theory. In every case in
which metaphysics in called upon, there is an underlying motivation to appeal to otherworldly,
unsubstantiated, phenomena. Fairytales, used to only booster humanities ill gotten, preconceived
notions of reality. Metaphysics is very much a relevant question, and those of us committed to
its “overcoming” cannot accept metaphysics as irrelevant until its position is that of mere
historical anomaly, to be learned from but never returned to in seriousness.
That being said, in recent years we have seen a movement toward science as the
epistemological replacement for metaphysics. Yet, rarely do we see science critiqued, unless it is
held up against the archaic metaphysics of the past. Metaphysics will not do as the opponent of
science. Does that mean science is free from opposition? Martin Heidegger and John Dewey
both took on the question of science through the negation of metaphysics.
Thus, metaphysics is relevant only if it is be defeated to make room for new avenues of
knowledge. We must place metaphysics beside science to see which stands and which falls.
1

Indeed, while the scientist may not be engaged in metaphysical thought, metaphysical thought
still threatens his disciple.
Yet, it is simply not enough to say metaphysics is defeated, we must show how it is
defeated, and what will replace it. Martin Heidegger and John Dewey share several views
concerning metaphysics. Both contend that classical metaphysics arose historically, with
Descartes playing a pivotal role its evolution. Both place the classic subject-object distinction
under the classification of metaphysics. In fact, it could be argued that it is the abandonment of
this distinction as metaphysical that grounds the thought of both thinkers. Nonetheless, with
such similar philosophical views, both thinkers represent polar opposites when the subject turns
to science. Why is it that two philosophers, almost contemporaries, who share similar view’s
concerning the role and emergence of metaphysics, would have such divergent views with
regards to science?
At first it may appear strange that one should want to compare critiques of metaphysics
with science. After all, is not science contemporary man’s response to metaphysics? Do we not
now live in a post-metaphysical world in which nothing is accepted as permanently fixed,
infinite, or unchanging? Science, it would seem, has moved well beyond the question of
metaphysics. “If we apply to metaphysics the criteria of truth which have been accepted
generally in modern science, we conclude, on good grounds, that tenets of metaphysics (e.g.
reality of the external world, mental character of the universe, etc.) are neither true nor false, but
meaningless.” 1 The biologist in his lab has no concern with establishing a metaphysical concept,
only with identifying what is empirically evident. The practice of science is beyond a
metaphysical framework.

1

Philipp Frank, “Metaphysical Interpretations of Science part. 1,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 1 No. 2, August 1950, 60.
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When these philosophers turn to science, their views, influenced by their critique of
metaphysics, diverge. Dewey is a champion of science, deriving his instrumentalism from
Darwinian evolution and biology, as well as psychology, anthropology, sociology etc.
Heidegger, on the other hand, does not share Dewey’s glowing esteem for science, but rather
includes science in his critique of metaphysics, arguing that science is, at its very essence,
metaphysical and therefore must be “overcome” in the same breath as metaphysics.
The purpose of this thesis is to etch out why these philosophers, who appear to share so
much, arrive at opposing understandings of science and its role in contemporary life. Therefore,
while the similarities between the thinkers will play an important role, it is really their
differences, those areas of their thought that force disagreement, which will require special
attention.
The first chapter provides an outline of Heidegger’s metaphysical thought, with particular
emphasis on the historical nature of metaphysics, the ontological distinction between Beings and
being, and its relation to the subject-object distinction, as well has Heidegger’s view concerning
science as metaphysics and its consequences, namely the objectification and enframent of the
world through technology.
The second chapter engages the thought of Dewey and will follow the outline of the first,
identifying Dewey’s critique of metaphysics as historically influenced, Dewey’s view on the
subject-object distinction, and finally Dewey on science in a post metaphysical world.
The third chapter compares the similarities and differences between the two thinkers. By
comparing the two, the quintessential differences between the two emerge and one can achieve a
full understanding as to why Heidegger and Dewey differ in regards to science.

3

CHAPTER 1: HEIDEGGER, METAPHYSICS, AND SCIENCE
1.1 The Heideggerian Understanding of Metaphysics
To understand Heidegger’s view of science, one must understand his critique of
metaphysics. In fact, there is essentially no difference between Heidegger’s deconstruction of
metaphysics and his views on science, since he rejects science as metaphysical. Furthermore, a
thorough investigation of Heidegger’s metaphysics and its relation to science will provide a
foundation for comparison to Dewey.
While there appears to be a shift in the understanding of metaphysics from the early to
the late Heidegger, one thing remains unchanged; in Heidegger’s view, metaphysics equals an
end for philosophy and must be “overcome.” However, the overcoming of metaphysics should
not be understood as a complete dismissal or defeat of metaphysics. John Stambaugh writes that
Heidegger’s use of the word Überwindung, meaning defeat and abandonment, should not be
confused with the intended sense of Verwindung, “When something is overcome in the sense of
being verwunden, it is, so to speak, incorporated.” 2 That is, Heidegger does not wish to ignore
thousands of years of metaphysics, but rather wishes to reunderstand and interpret metaphysics
within a proper ontological framework. “Thus, to overcome metaphysics would mean to
incorporate metaphysics, perhaps with the hope, but not with the certainty, of elevating it to a
new reality.” 3
This elevation of new metaphysical thought occurs through the deconstruction of
metaphysics. “Heidegger sometimes says that metaphysics is the oblivion of being, sometimes

2

Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy” (New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973) 84 Footnote 1
(Hereafter (EP))
3
ibid, 84 Footnote 1
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that it is the oblivion of the difference between being and beings, and sometimes that it is the
oblivion of the truth of being.” 4 In all cases, metaphysics obliterates the investigation and
understanding of being. Heidegger’s understanding of metaphysics stems, as does all of
Heidegger’s thought, from his ontology.
For Heidegger, metaphysics, at least traditionally, has branched from a misunderstanding,
or more accurately, a complete ignorance, of the ontological distinction, that is, the distinction
between Being and beings. Mark Okrent writes, “Heidegger does believe that traditional
metaphysical thinking assimilates being in the primary sense with a being and thus forgets the
distinction between being and beings; this is part of what he calls the ‘onto-theological’ character
of metaphysics.” 5 An investigation into the “onto-theological character of metaphysics” will aid
in developing a Heideggerian understanding of metaphysics.
Metaphysics is “onto” in that it emerges out of a particular misunderstanding of the
“ontological difference.” The ontological difference is the distinction between being and beings.
Beings are to be understood as separate entities and their characteristics. Heidegger terms this
understanding of beings as “ontic.” For example, the difference between a keyboard and a
coffee cup is an “ontic” difference. The two entities are distinguished according to their
particular characteristics, i.e. the coffee cup is made out of porcelain and has no moving parts,
while the keyboard is made of plastic, has keys and electronic components. Being, on the other
hand, is focused on what it means to be, to exist. Being (ontological) underlies beings (ontic),
for beings must first be before they can be classified as beings. The Ontological is the central
focus for Heidegger.

4

Mark Okrent, “Heidegger’s Pragmatism: Understanding, Being, and the Critique of Metaphysics” (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell university press, 1988), 225 (Hereafter (HP))
5
ibid 226
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Metaphysics is “theological” in that “To think about beings as a whole is to ask about
why everything that is, is. It is to ask the question, ‘why are there things rather than nothing?’
The metaphysical name for the answer to this question, the being that accounts for the coming to
be of everything that is, including itself, is ‘God.’” 6 Yet theological, in the Heideggerian since
does not literally mean God, but any exterior projection out of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. That
is, any attempt to place one’s self out of one’s world, thus breaking one’s ontological connection
to the world.
Therefore, metaphysics is “onto-theological” in so far as it searches for an unchanging,
permanent ground or a foundation for all entities. Okrent writes, “So metaphysics is ontology
and theology, and this means that metaphysics is the thought that accounts for the beings in
terms of their ground.” In other words, metaphysics attempts at establishing a permanent ground
or foundation that is unchanging and essential. This is unacceptable for Heidegger, who bases the
whole of his thought around the notion of an “ontological distinction.”
All philosophy, and a large part of western civilization, misunderstood this distinction.
This misunderstanding has allowed for the emergence of metaphysics. Heideggerian
metaphysics is not concerned with merely “top-down” metaphysics where by our world is
dictated, limited, and controlled by supernatural entities, though this form of metaphysics
certainly falls within Heidegger’s definition. But, more fundamentally, metaphysics is
understood as a ground, a permanent and unchanging groundwork.
The general metaphysical name for the ground that grounds beings is ‘being’. So
metaphysics is the science of being as the ground for beings…Because being is
understood by metaphysics as the ground of beings, metaphysics always drives
toward ultimate grounds, the ultimate principles that account for everything
else…. the being of beings is thus thought of in advance as the grounding ground.
Therefore all metaphysics is at bottom, and from the ground up, what grounds,

6
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what gives account of the ground, what is called to account by the ground, and
finally what call the ground to account. 7
In Summary, Heidegger understands metaphysics as an attempt to establish a ground for
beings while simultaneously missing the nature of being itself. As a result, metaphysics forms a
control structure, where one can thus establish a ground, limit beings to that ground, objectify,
manipulate, and fully grasp them. This definition will find clarity as we examine Heidegger’s
understanding of the tradition. And with this understanding in place, we can fully examine
Heidegger’s understanding of positive science as metaphysical.

1.2 Metaphysics and the Tradition
For Heidegger, ideas move history; however this movement has not been one of
advancement, but rather of decline, particularly in regards to the question and understanding of
the “nature” of being. This decline is a symptom of the disease of metaphysics. For one of the
characteristics of Heidegger’s understanding of the nature of metaphysics is its essential property
of limitation. Thus, a tradition that has adopted metaphysics as its guide has set its own limits.
This tradition keeps [Dasein] from providing its own guidance, whether in
inquiring or in choosing…when tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such
a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most
part, that it rather becomes concealed…. Tradition takes what has come down to
us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial
‘sources’ from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in
part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an
origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is
something which we need not even understand. 8

The rise of metaphysics within the western philosophical tradition began almost at the same time
that philosophy itself began, with the Greeks, “Greek ontology and its history…in their

7

ibid 227
Martin Heidegger, “Being and Time”, ed. John Macquarie & Edward Robinson (San Francisco, CA: Harper
Collins Publishers, 962) 42-43 (Hereafter (BT))
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numerous filiations and distortions, determine the conceptual character of philosophy even
today.” 9
Heidegger points to Aristotle’s “essay on time” as “the first detailed interpretation of this
phenomenon which has come down to us. Every subsequent account of time, including
Bergson’s, has been essentially determined by it. ” 10 This essay set a metaphysical framework
that subsequently dictates and controls the tradition’s philosophy of time, “When we analyze the
Aristotelian conception, it will likewise become clear, as we go back, that the Kantian account of
time operates within the structures which Aristotle has set forth; this means that Kant’s basic
ontological orientation remains that of the Greeks, in spite of all the distinctions which arise in a
new inquiry.” 11 Unfortunately, the section of Being and Time in which this interpretation was to
take place (the quote appears in the second introduction) was never published. Mark Okrent
argues that this section of Being and Time was never published because Heidegger recognized
his own philosophy as turning metaphysical and therefore “abandoned that program and
eventually came to ‘attack’ metaphysics itself.” 12
One example of Heidegger’s attack on metaphysics through the tradition is his critique of
Rene Descartes. While the tradition offers a myriad of examples to choose from, Descartes
offers the best example for our purposes because: 1) Both Heidegger and Dewey 13 view
Cartesian metaphysics as representational of the tradition, both in how Descartes is confined by
the metaphysical tradition prior to his philosophy, and how the tradition since is influenced, yet
remains fundamentally unchanged, post-Descartes. 2) The critique of Descartes is a theme found

9

ibid., 43
ibid., 49
11
ibid 49
12
(HP)., 218
13
Discussed in chapter 2
10

8

in both the early and late Heidegger, though the nature of the critique differ from the early to the
late Heidegger, Descartes remains the quintessential metaphysician.
In the essay, Modern science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics, Heidegger identifies
modern philosophy as beginning with Descartes. Prior to Descartes, particularly in the middle
ages, philosophy “if it stood independently at all-under the exclusive domination of theology,
and gradually degenerated into a mere analysis of concepts and elucidation of traditional
opinions and propositions.” 14 Medieval Philosophy cannot be said to stand-alone because its
grounds had previously been established through metaphysics. God, the Good, Logic and other
such concepts permeated philosophy, providing grounds and limitations. One cannot think
outside of metaphysics because it is precisely these concepts upon which philosophy was built.
To a Medieval philosopher, to do philosophy without appealing to supernatural theories is like
building a house on water, there is no foundation on which the house can stand. Thus,
metaphysics limited medieval philosophy from both the inside, by limiting its grounds, and from
the outside, by controlling its path of thought. When a medieval thinker dared to present a
philosophy contrary to the established metaphysical order, as with William of Ockham or
Galileo, that individual faced excommunication at best, torture, imprisonment, and execution at
worst.“Then Descartes appeared and liberated philosophy from this disgraceful position.” 15
With the Cogito, Descartes introduced radical doubt, and therefore could not accept the
pre-established metaphysical framework. “He began by doubting everything, but this doubt
finally did run into something that could no longer be doubted, for, inasmuch as the doubter

14

Martin Heidegger, “Modern Science, Metaphysics, Mathematics,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San
Francisco, CA: Harper Collings Publishers, 1993), 297 (Hereafter (MMM))
15
ibid., 297
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doubts, he cannot doubt that he is present and must be present in order to doubt at all.” 16 Thus
emerged the Descartes famous, Cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am.
Heidegger recognizes the Cogito as representing a paradigm shift in philosophy, a
complete “regrounding” of philosophy, where as before, Platonic/Aristotelian/Thomistic
otherworldliness was the foundation for philosophy, doubt now became the new grounds.
“Philosophy itself, however, was thus brought to the insight that doubting must stand at the
beginning of philosophy: reflection upon knowledge itself and its possibility.” 17 How does doubt
lead to epistemology? Doubt must have something to doubt, so the question of how and what we
know becomes central. Heidegger writes, “A theory of knowledge had to be erected before a
theory of the world.” 18 For if the world is subject to doubt, our means of doubt, namely
knowledge, must be firmly grounded. Thus, according to Heidegger, epistemology became the
distinguishing characteristic of modern philosophy, trying to provide, or discover, a ground for
thought.
Does this mean Descartes freed philosophy from metaphysics? Heidegger’s answer is no,
metaphysics still saturates Descartes and modern philosophy. While Descartes may have
succeeded in doubting the traditions understanding of metaphysics, he still misunderstands the
nature of being and thus still falls within the Heideggerian definition of metaphysics.
In Being and Time, Heidegger specifically attacks Cartesian ontology as producing a
“bare subject without a world.” Heidegger despised any notion of subjectivity throughout his
philosophical career. The Cartesian Cogito proposes to produce an unshakable ground for
thought, namely, the subject. Unshakeable in the since that Cogito Ergo Sum appears to

16

ibid., 297
ibid., 297
18
ibid., 297
17
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demonstrate that the only undeniable ground of thought is one’s existence. Descartes, as with
the rest of the tradition, understood existence as contingent upon a substance.
Descartes understood substance as a free-standing entity. “By substance we can
understand nothing else than an entity which is in such a way that it needs no other entity in
order to be.” 19 Notice Heidegger’s emphasis on is, because it is the distinction between is and
being that constitutes Heidegger’s critique of Descartes. Descartes sees substance as a condition
for existence, that is, “After Descartes a cognition is grounded if and only if what is cognized is
adequate to serve as a principle of ground for the rest of my cognition, and this is the case only if
I can be certain of that initial cognition, can know its truth in such a way that doubt concerning it
is inconceivable…only the subjectivity of the subject, the self-consciousness of the subject itself,
can be known in this way, and all other certainty is mediated by the self-certainty of selfconscious subjectivity. So, in a crucial sense, being is identified with subjectivity.” 20 To be is to
be a something, fixed and definitive, against other things which one is not.
The turn to subjectivity stands as a distinguishing mark of the modern era; where prior to
Descartes, man identified himself as “zoion logon echon, an animal rationale, a child of God,
etc., into a subject.” 21 Subject is derived from the Greek hupokeimenon meaning what lie’s
before and beneath, thus drawling everything unto itself by serving as the prior and stable
foundation for all else. According to Kockelmans reading of Heidegger, the shift from animal
rationale to a subject signifies a shift in the essence of man himself. “As Heidegger sees it, the
decisive factor in the constitution of the modern era is not so much the fact that man has freed
himself from his previous obligations and, thus, freed himself onto himself, but rather the fact

19

(BT)., 125
(HP)., 229
21
Joseph J. Kockelmans “Heidegger and Science” (Lanham, MD: University of America press, 1985),178
(Hereafter (HS))
20

11

that the essence of man himself has changed.” 22 Thus, Dasein’s essence changed from a rational
animal to a subject that serves as a foundation for all knowledge; man became the mark of all
things because as a necessary subject, man stands before and beneath reality. Thus, Descartes
initiated a paradigm shift in the tradition with the Cogito, namely moving man out of the world
and making him the grounds for the world. The subject is like atlas, holding the world upon his
shoulders but forever separated from it.
The motif of Cartesian separation and objectification continues through Heidegger’s
reading of Descartes and mathematics. Heidegger argues that Descartes’ reliance on mathematics
and desire to objectify nature creates an egocentric philosophy in which the autonomous subject
is the “objectifier” and nature is that to be objectified and grasped. The Cartesian subject can
fully grasp, objectify, manipulate, and control the exterior world; thus “the kind of being which
belongs to sensuous perception is obliterated, and so is any possibility that the entities
encountered in such perception should be grasped in their Being.” 23
Heideggerian phenomenology cannot accept such a philosophy because it misunderstands
the nature of being. Heidegger argues that one cannot posit a subject separate from the world,
but rather Dasein is in the world, not as water in a glass, but rather Dasein is interconnected in an
intimate relationship with the world in its very being, that to remove Dasein from the world is to
remove Dasein’s being. The world does not stand against Dasein; rather the world provides
Dasein its very being. The term Dasein reflects this, for it literally translates as There-being, or
one there in a world amongst everything else.

22
23

ibid., 178
(BT)., 130
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1.3 Modern Science and Technology as Metaphysical
1.3.1 Objectivity
Objectivity, or rather, the objectifying nature of metaphysics, plays a pivotal role in
Heidegger’s metaphysical critique of modern science. One of the features of metaphysics,
according to Heidegger, is objectification. While it may appear contradictory for Heidegger to
place both subjectivity and objectivity under metaphysics, for it would appear that at the very
minimum, if the subject is not to serve as our grounds, then surely the objectivity of things can
be our guide. It would appear that without a subject, objects in the world are all that are left.
However, Heidegger demonstrates that the distinction between subject and object is itself a
metaphysical distinction.
According to Heidegger, the word object, at least since the fifteenth century, means
opposition, a standing against or what is opposite the subject. The objective becomes that which
is not the subject; it is the world separate and apart from the subject. Heidegger provides a
“sketch” of how this understanding has manifested itself in the tradition.
For Luther, object means:
The opposed “status”:
The Jewish status and the Christian status:
“To adopt the opposing status.”
Since the eighteenth century, the word has been taken as the translation of
obiectum. A quarrel begins as to whether one should say ob-ject or obstacle…For a carpenter the wood is the object, that is, ‘what he works against’when he functions as cause.
With regard to the ontic-ontological distinction of beings and Being, what
is objective is that in the object which has color, extension, etc.; what is objective:
what constitutes its standing against as such. 24
Thus, the subject-object distinction emerges out of metaphysics, which in turn has emerged out
of the onto-ontological distinction. It is the misunderstanding of being as Cogito and subject that
has lead the tradition to posit the rest of “the world” as over and against the subject.
24

(EP)., 58
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…if the world appears merely as something that has meaning only in
regard to man, then it becomes man’s basic task to conquer the world. And man
conquers the world mainly by means of objectifying projections, designs,
calculations, and techniques…The more the world of things is perceived as that
which is to be conquered and, thus, the more objective all beings begin to appear,
the more subjective and subject becomes and begins to claim priority, and the
more a science of the world changes into a science of man. 25
The movement toward objectification in modern science is obvious. Science aims to
investigate the world by separating it from the “subject”. With the appearance of separation, the
scientist believes he can fully grasp every aspect of the entity because he stands outside of the
entity. This “birds-eye view” of nature leads one to believe the object can be “objectified”, that
is, placed within a metaphysical framework where the entity is calculated, defined, and
classified; thus creating an artificial boundary. What fits within the boundary is the object, what
stands outside of this boundary is not the object. Any “object” in the world is subject to science
(according to science). Therefore, modern science creates a worldview in which the subject
stands in the middle, surrounded yet separate from objects waiting to be scientifically enclosed.

1.3.2 Objectification and Mathematics
While objectification is indeed a central aspect of modern science, it does not serve as the
essence of modern science, rather objectification emerges out of mathematics, and it is the
mathematical that becomes the essence of modern science. Of course, essence here should not
be confused the some definitive permanent reality, rather essence, in the Heideggerian
understanding can be understood as that which something does. Thus, the essence of science
cannot be understood as if science is defined a prori, but rather as the action that science enviably
undertakes.
How does the mathematical serve as the grounds of metaphysics? One reason is that it is
the very nature of mathematics to “will to a new formation and self-grounding of the form of
25

(HS)., 178-179
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knowledge as such.” That is, mathematics que mathematics has as its very nature objectification.
Mathematically, metaphysically based knowledge must objectify, for in order to be based in
mathematics, which acts as the source of all knowledge, knowledge must be able to be
represented mathematically.
Because mathematics is a priori, prior to any experience of revelation of a thing, that
thing has already been placed within a mathematical framework, a framework that defines,
thematizes, and objectifies the thing according to its relation to the mathematical.
To illustrate the role of mathematics in modern science, Heidegger turns to Galileo. “In
1638 Galileo wrote in his Discourses on Two New Sciences ‘I think here of a body thrown on a
horizontal plane and every obstacle excluded…the motion of the body over this plane would be
uniform and perpetual, if this plane were extended infinitely’” Kockelman recognizes that
through this thought experiment, “Galileo gave himself a cognition in advance about the
determination of material things.” 26 Galileo’s a priori grounding in mathematics lead him to
conceptually predetermine the nature all material objects, arguing that when thrown on a
mathematical plane, every object will behave according to mathematics. Kockelman continues
There is here a prior comprehending of what should be essential to all bodies and
their motions; all bodies are alike; there is no privileged motion; every place is
like every other place; each moment in time is like any other; every force is to be
determined by the change of motion which it causes. All determinations of bodies
have one basic characteristic as their origin: each natural process is nothing but
the space-time determination of the motions of certain point-masses. 27
To put it another way, the mathematical has created a world by which everything is placed on a
mathematical plane or grid, by which its time and place can be plotted, every object and its
nature is pre-determined by the laws of this grid, so when one imagines throwing a football from
plot A to plot B on the grid, the football, prior to ever being thrown, is already defined and
26
27
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determined by the mathematics (force, gravity, inertia, time, space, momentum, etc.,) in which it
is contained. The nature of the football is taken in advance of it unconcealing itself, and is
therefore never allowed to fully disclose itself because an image of what and how a football is
and must behave is imposed on the thing a priori. Thus it is with everything that exists according
to modern science. Everything’s nature and behavior is subject to these mathematical laws and
thus are pre-cognized before they can reveal themselves. In this way the mathematical
objectifies. Math predetermines, predefines, and confines the truth of objects to mathematics
itself. And with this as the grounds of modern thought, the rise of method and thematization in
science is accounted.
Modern Science’s drive toward thematization represents yet another mark of
Modern Science’s metaphysically determined objectifying nature. Thematization, or the
movement toward theory in science, is undoubtedly prevalent in modernity.
In, Being and Time, Heidegger draws the distinction between objects “ready-at-hand” and
objects “present-at-hand.” The world “ready-at-hand” is the world encountered on the
ontological level. One has an intimate and total relationship to his surroundings, so much so that
one can function in and with the world without awareness or specific consideration toward what
one is doing. For example, I have been typing the previous paragraphs with absolutely no
conscious realization of my use of the keyboard as an instrument of typing, nor the chair I am
sitting in as an instrument for sitting; nor the floor; books, pens, papers, etc. All of which I have
used as items of gear with full competence and functionality, none of which have required
specific, conscious consideration or attention. Heidegger argues I have been functioning with
these objects on the ontological level; they are objects “ready-to-hand” and their functionality is
not limited by what I choose to do with them. The keyboard can instantly go from an instrument
for typing to a table for my coffee. Heidegger writes that “the world is that in terms of which the
16

ready-to-hand is ready-to-hand.” 28 That is, our ontological and therefore proper relationship to
the world is the pre-conceptual relationship.
However, say the keyboard, perhaps after functioning as a coffee table, where to break.
Before me now is blunt material upon which my attention and consideration must now turn. The
keyboard no longer functions as an object “ready-to-hand” but as an object “present-at-hand”
broken from it functionality, it is now an object to be studied que its objectiveness. This is what
science does, it facilities a shift from the fundamental ontological engagement with the world, to
a separation from the world, in order to know objects. The biologist who approaches the fish
must, necessarily, first encounter the fish on an ontological level. He then breaks this relationship
with the world in order to reveal the particular aspect of the fish to be studied. Kockelmans
writes,
Everything…depends on this formal aspect: the foundations of scientific
research, the
methods, the language, the type of argumentation, the mode of
intelligibility, and the typical conception of truth and certitude. Thus, at the root
of every science we find a “making present” of the beings that are within-theworld. This “making present” differs from our everyday concern in that it aims
solely at disclosing the beings in an “objective” way, i.e., as pure data of
theoretical observation, as ‘merely being there. 29
Thus, when the scientist studies an object, it is always in a secondary manner, abstracted from
the reality of one’s original encounter. Thus, the fullness of our primordial encounter with an
object is lost, never to be regained as long as the object remains “present-at-hand.”
This creates an abstraction for science. In every case, the scientist focuses on one
particular aspect of the object, thus clouding or ignoring the totality of one’s phenomenological
experience with the object.
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Therefore, science is not only metaphysical because it necessarily is based upon a
mathematical model that pushes towards classification and control, but also because the nature of
science is to focus and ignore aspects and parts of an object. Thus creating an internal separation
within the object itself, in which the parts of an object can be objectified, where the dog or the
human is merely a conglomerate of sections, each separate unto itself, somehow combined and
unified around a central substance.

1.3.3 Technology

So, as we have seen, Heidegger recognizes science as essentially metaphysical and

metaphysics as something to be “overcome.” Thus, as Heidegger sees it, our modern movement
toward a positivistic scientific worldview is ultimately to our determent. This can most easily be
recognized in the “enframing” power of modern technology.
Modern technology is the offspring of a metaphysical understanding of the world.
“Modern science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of
forces.” 30 The same movement to objectify found in metaphysics has been translated into
Modern science.
Heidegger tells us that technology, in its essence, is revealing. “Technology is therefore
no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole
realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e.
truth...” 31 That is, technology, as with everything else, is only knowable in so far as it reveals
itself to Dasein. However, this revelation is not free from semblance or distortion. Rather, the
metaphysical structure is so prominent within our understanding of technology that technology
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itself can serve as a semblance. That is to say, the objectification and totalization inherent in
metaphysics is also present in our understanding of technology. As a result, technology itself is
engaged in a movement of totalization. Heidegger refers to this movement as Ge-stell or
enframing. Therefore, the essence of technology is revealing and what is revealed is enframing.
An example will help to illustrate enframing. Heidegger gives the example of a power
plant built on the Rhine River.
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine. It sets the Rhine to
supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the turbines turning. This
turning sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric current
for which the long distance power station and its network of cables are set up to
dispatch electricity. In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the
orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears to be
something at our command. 32
The first issue of note in the example is the appearance of the Rhine. The Rhine does not appear
as a river, but as a power supply. Technology has enframed the appearance of the Rhine so that
now it is merely an extension of the power plant, an energy source, a tool and nothing more.
Technology has enframed, objectified, and totalized the Rhine into an extension of technology.
Yet the example reveals further technological enframing. Note the sentence, “This
turning sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for which the
long distance power station and its network of cables are set up to dispatch electricity.” The
power plant supplies energy quite literally into a grid, a Ge-stell. The power-grid transcends
great distances and supplies power to people throughout the country. Thus technology enframes
further by unifying all under a grid. Where before there were individual communities responsible
for their own subsistence, now all are subject to the collective grid; in fact, citizens are so
enframed by technology that they become dependent. The power-grid breaks down and society
effectively ceases to operate. This became evident in 2003 when the entire northeastern power32
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gird collapsed and the city of New York essentially shut down. Uncertain of what to do without
their benevolent master, people left their cars in the middle of roads, businesses closed, and the
entire city was brought to a standstill. The citizens of New York, as with us all, were wholly
enframed by technology. Furthermore, the source of the blackout was in Easterlake Ohio, not
New York, thus demonstrating the totalizing capacity of technology. Communities as far as
Toronto Canada were collected under, and affected by, the totalizing nature of technology.
Heidegger continues by saying “But, it will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the
landscape, is it not? Perhaps, but how? In no other way than as an object on call for inspection by
a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry.” 33 The river’s appearance now discloses a
new world. The Rhine reveals itself, not as what it is, but as what Heidegger refers to as
Standing-Reserve or a resource. “The word ‘Standing-Reserve’ assumes the rank of an inclusive
rubric. It designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is wrought
upon by the revealing that challenges.” 34
Standing-Reserve is the reduction of being to a resource for the maintenance and
expansion of technology. Thus the Rhine is in Standing-Reserve because it is an instrument for
the production of power or for public viewing.
However, Standing-Reserve is not limited to the Rhine. Dasein also finds itself as
Standing-Reserve. This is perhaps the most dangerous element of technological enframing. As
Standing-Reserve, Dasein is simply another cog in the technological machine. Man exists to
serve technology, to produce it, correct it, and ultimately become dependent and enframed by it.
Standing-Reserve and enframing are interconnected. “We now name the challenging
claim that gathers man with a view of ordering the self-revealing as standing reserve: Ge-stell
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[enframing]” 35 There is no hierarchy, no way for enframing to occur without producing standingreserve.
From what we have seen, it appears technology is an unstoppable juggernaut quite
literally devouring the countryside. One might argue that being is so enframed that to break
from enframing would require a catastrophic event, something that would tear down our
technological world and require a new beginning. However, all is not lost. While Heidegger
does not specifically produce an alternative to our technological age, in fact “when in interviews
Heidegger was asked whether from his thought constructive proposals could be derived, his
answers were emphatically negative” 36 Heidegger does however provide brief insights into a
new world free from modern technologies enframing and how such a world could possibly be
achieved.
For example, Heidegger identifies what he calls “the saving power.” “Thus where
enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense.
But where danger is,
The saving power also.” 37
Heidegger suggests that it is Dasein who has the power of “granting”, that is, Dasein is necessary
for the revelation of truth. It is man that unconceals and conceals, that allows for the appearance
of truth and semblance, and it is in this capacity that the saving power rests upon mans shoulders.
Man, as granter, has the sole capacity to recognize the essence of technology as enframing.
Thus, it is in the very essence that threatens us that we are saved. “Everything, then, depends
upon this: that we ponder this rising and that, recollecting, we watch over it. How can this
happen? Above all through our catching sight of the essential unfolding in technology, instead of
merely gaping at the technological. So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we
35
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remain transfixed in the will to master it. We press on past the essence of technology.” 38 Man
must become the keeper of the essence of technology because it is man alone who grants its
unconcealment.
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CHAPTER 2: DEWEY, METAPHYSICS, AND SCIENCE
2.1 Dewey’s Instrumentalism
Too often, the strength of science, its methods, and its discoveries are ignored in
philosophy. This is partly due to an archaic metaphysical system upon which philosophy is
based. John Dewey saw the absolute importance of science, and the negative affect metaphysics
can have on our theories of knowledge. By studying Dewey’s philosophy, one can 1) clearly
identify why classical metaphysics arose 2) Distinguish Dewey’s view of metaphysics from the
traditions 3) Show how Dewey’s view affects the metaphysical notion of substance. It is only
after such an understanding is in place can one truly understand the importance of Dewey.
John Dewey classifies his philosophy as “empirical naturalism” or “naturalistic
empiricism.” 39 Empirical, in so far as one can only know what is revealed through experience
and naturalistic in that the experience upon which one obtains knowledge is always derived from
one’s natural environment. However, it should be noted that Dewey’s understanding of the
natural environment is not limited to what one normally considers “nature” (the earth, tree,
animals etc) but also man’s social environment as well.
In either case, man is not separate, over and above, his surroundings, but an intimately
connected part of the environment. Dewey’s philosophy of knowledge is often referred to as
“Instrumentalism.” Instrumentalism holds that the idea’s, actions, motivations, and desires of the
human being are instruments, or tools, developed through evolution, in reaction to the
environment for the purpose of adaptation.
Dewey’s Instrumentalism places him in sharp contrast to traditional philosophers “as
widely diverse as rationalism, British empiricism, and Kantianism [who] have a common root in
39
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the ancient view which conceives the knower as a spectator of the world about him.” 40 For
Dewey, such schools of thought are based upon a false metaphysical assumption of a subject,
over and against, objects. For example, Dewey writes regarding Aristotelian epistemology,
There was bequeathed to generations of thinkers as an unquestioned axiom the
idea that knowledge is intrinsically a mere beholding or viewing of reality-the
spectator conception of knowledge. So deeply engrained was the idea that it
prevailed for centuries after the actual progress of science had demonstrated that
knowledge is power to transform the world, and centuries after the practice of
effective knowledge had adopted the method of experimentation. 41

Rather than a philosophy of being, which posits a concrete subject over and against the world,
Dewey’s is a philosophy of “becoming” in which one is not separated from the world, but is
inseparably interconnected to, and molded by the environment. 42 Writing in Experience and
Nature, “Every existence is an event” 43
With this basic understanding in place, one can investigate what Dewey has to say
regarding metaphysics in the tradition, as well as Dewey’s new conception of metaphysics.

2.2 The Historical and Psychological Emergence of Metaphysics
Dewey argues that classical philosophy arose out of the need to reconcile traditional
views with empirical scientific evidence. For example, Culture X has a moral/social taboo
against the wearing of cotton socks. This taboo, whatever its origin, has been reinforced through
tradition and practice. Perhaps, one poor individual took it upon himself to wear cotton socks
and days later was killed by a falling tree branch, thus furthering the taboo. However, such a
social peculiarity begins to seem foolish when faced with empirical, scientific evidence that
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shows there is no relation between the materials of one’s socks and falling tree branches. Thus,
according to Dewey, it becomes the role of the metaphysician to demonstrate, not only that the
social, political, and moral practices of the culture are true, but also that they are ultimately true.
The metaphysician, through “elaborate terminology, a hair-splitting logic, and a fictitious
devotion to the mere external forms of comprehensive and minute demonstration” 44 attempts to
show that there is a higher, otherworldly imperative demanding that socks be worn. Dewey
writes:
“Since [metaphysics] aimed at a rational justification of things that had been
previously accepted because of their emotional congeniality and social prestige, it
had to make much of the apparatus of reason and proof. Because of the lack of
intrinsic rationality in the matters with which it dealt, it leaned over backward, so
to speak, in parade of logical form…. when it comes to convincing men of the
truth of doctrines which are no longer to be accepted upon the say-so of custom
and social authority, but which also are not capable of empirical verification, there
is no recourse save to magnify the signs of rigorous thought and rigid
demonstration. Thus arises that appearance of abstract definition and ultrascientific argumentation which repels so many from philosophy but which has
been one of its chief attractions to its devotees.” 45

Thus, the origin of traditional metaphysics is in the psychological needs of the human psyche. It
is not because metaphysician’s successfully grasped the true nature of existence that
metaphysic’s arose. Rather, Dewey tells us that philosophy “did not develop in an unbiased way
from an open and unprejudiced origin. It had its task cut out for it from the start. It had a
mission to perform, and it was sworn in advance of to that mission.” 46 The mission was to
reinforce the beliefs already in existence. 47 One may respond, “Didn’t the Greek’s kill Socrates
for shaking their traditional beliefs?” Absolutely, the methods of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
44
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were certainly radical and this shock the Greek’s to the core. However, Dewey tells us that,
when viewed historically, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are deeply indebted to Greek culture, so
much so that their philosophical systems could not have arisen without their social
environment. 48 This “apologetic spirit of philosophy” 49 continues through to the medieval
period, reducing philosophy as a means to reinforce the positions of the church, up through
Hegel, who used idealism to buttress the scientific and political environment of the time.
However, after Darwin, this form of philosophy has no place. Metaphysics is revealed as merely
psychological attempts to make sense of what is nonsensical. Metaphysics reveals “a confession
of inability to master the courses of things that specifically concern us.” 50 The old tradition must
be replaced by a new metaphysics.

2.3 Dewey’s New Metaphysics
Dewey understands metaphysics as the search to for “ultimate origins” or the fixed,
unchanging, permanent traits of reality. He recognizes the “seeds” of metaphysics in the
Aristotelian definition of metaphysics as the search for being que being. And as previously stated
the desire for such permanence has a psychological origin. As Robert E. Dewey puts it, “He is
accusing his predecessors of being trapped in the snares of what one might call an ‘emotional
ontological argument’, whose schema is: I need the security of X, therefore X has Being.” 51
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As stated above, Dewey identifies the “subject-matter” of traditional metaphysical
concerns with antecedently ultimate origins. However, scientific inquiry has usurped this
investigation away from metaphysics. Metaphysics begins with the assumption of a permanent
and necessary universe, and then attempts to derive an origin from this assumption; arguing that,
inherent in the metaphysical structures underlying nature, certain particulars emerge; these
particulars have their “ultimate” source in the fixed metaphysical reality. Science, on the other
hand, begins with a particular problematic situation that must be overcome for example,
causality; Dewey writes “Any intelligible question as to causation seems to be a wholly scientific
question. Starting from any given existence, be it a big thing like a solar system or a small thing
like a rise of temperature, we may ask how it came about.” 52 Take for example a polluted river.
The pollution presents an obvious problem and it is the role of science to take on this problem.
Part of the inquiry would include an investigation into the source or cause of the pollution. This
is necessary because otherwise the problem cannot be resolved. Science then investigates the
problem of cause through other particulars causes (i.e. the slash and burn of a forest leads to
runoff of pollutants into the river, which leads to poisoned drinking water, etc), and so on until
the practical capacity of our questioning reaches an impasse. It is this distinction between the
all-encompassing generalizations of metaphysics and the investigations of particular entities that
sets science above metaphysics. 53
To further demonstrate the innate failure of metaphysical inquiry, Dewey provides an
example of attempting to trace the “ultimate” origins of the French language.
Thus we might inquire as to the ‘ultimate’ origin of the French Language.
This would take us back to certain definite antecedent existences, such as persons
speaking the Latin tongues, others speaking barbarian tongues; the contact of
these peoples in war, commerce, political administration, education, etc. But the
52
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term ‘ultimate’ has meaning only in relation to the particular existence in
question: French speech. We are landed in another historic set of existences,
having their own specific antecedents. The case is not otherwise if we ask for the
ultimate origin of human speech in general. The inquiry takes us back to animal
cries, gestures, etc., certain conditions of intercourse, etc. 54
Dewey’s point here is to demonstrate that in investigating the casual origins of language,
or any causal relationship at that, the investigation never yields an ultimate origin. There is
always a plurality of causes for any particular thing. There is nothing inherent within Latin that
necessitated its evolution into French. 55 Rather, it is only through the interaction of several
factors that French arose. 56
Inquiry into the ultimate origins of the universe and everything in it yields similar results.
Dewey argues that such an inquiry, taken as a whole, is “meaningless.” Yet if one were to
search for an ultimate origin through particulars, (as one must necessarily do) the results always
yield the origin of that particular problem, no more no less, and any attempt to generalize one
particular origin into a comprehensive ultimate origin always fails. 57 No origin can be said to be
solitary, fixed, and ultimate. And when, as inevitably happens, we reach the limits of our
capacity to investigate, “reference to some immanent law or cause which forced the evolution
will be found to be a lazy cloak for our ignorance of the specific facts needed in order to deal
successfully with the question.” 58 It is the role of science, which never seeks necessary, ultimate
traits, and not metaphysics to investigate causal relationships and questions of origin. Thus,
metaphysics fails in its purpose and therefore must be abandoned.
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However, it must be understood that, in Dewey’s eyes, science is not about inquiry into
origins qua origins, but about future practice and societal improvement. The issue is not where
we came from for its own sake, but the application of that inquiries acquired knowledge and its
application in the future. For example, the brilliance of Darwin is not solely found in his theory,
but that his theory began a paradigm shift that affected every future inquiry. The theory of
evolution created a “structure” in which other inquires must fit. The overt purpose of science is
not the deconstruction of metaphysically grounded origins, it just so happens that these origins
become deconstructed as a result of our scientific investigations.
It is the role of science, not metaphysics to investigate causality, connections, and
interrelations. However, Dewey does not completely dismiss the possibility of any form of
metaphysical inquiry. Remember, Dewey understands metaphysics as the search for “ultimate
traits”, and while modern science has undercut the traditional role of metaphysical inquiry,
ultimate traits still exist in nature. Therefore, Dewey does not call for the complete destruction
of metaphysics; only a shift in the aims of metaphysics, from other worldly permanence and
ultimate causation, to what is ultimately universal in nature. Dewey’s new metaphysics is
concerned with “Specifically diverse existences, interaction, [and] change” 59 These natural traits
appear to have a certain permanence, for “they are found equally and indifferently whether a
subject-matter in question be dated 1915 or ten million years B.C. Accordingly, they would seem
to deserve the name of ultimate, or irreducible, traits. As such they may be made the object of a
kind of inquiry differing from that which deals with the genesis of a particular group of
existences, a kind of inquiry to which the name metaphysical may be given.” 60 That is scientific
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inquiry, as the foundation of knowledge, has demonstrated that these traits seem to exist
permanently in nature.
Clearly, metaphysics of change places Dewey in sharp contrast to a tradition that sought
ultimate, antecedent, permanence. What is real is what is permanent, while what changes and is
contingent is merely illusion or appearance. 61 Dewey refers to this misunderstanding as “the
philosophical fallacy” in Experience and Nature and it is this fallacy that has permeated
philosophical inquiry (partly due to the philosopher’s exhalative social or academic status) and
has biased philosophy against the truth of scientific revelation. 62

2.3.1 Change
Dewey is nothing if not a Darwinian. Dewey held that the theory of evolution has
completely undercut our previous assumptions about a fixed reality. “In Human Nature and
Conduct, published in 1922, he went so far as to define evolution strictly in terms of change. ‘In
fact evolution means continuity of change; and the fact that change may take the form of present
growth of complexity and interaction’” 63 Dewey used Darwinian evolution as the foundation for
his philosophy, and if evolution demonstrates all-encompassing change, than Dewey must accept
and explain this change. Old metaphysics centered on “ultimate reality” and permanence simply
will no longer do. 64
It could be argued it is precisely this issue, the issue of change, that gave birth to
western philosophy. The Platonic Forms and the Aristotelian substance both were developed to
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provide permanence to the phenomena of change. For if everything is in flux how is knowledge
about the world possible? The minute one thinks he knows something the next minute that
something has changed and one knows nothing again. Furthermore, if everything is in constant
flux, how does one account for “such familiar constancies as the daily sun, the dependable
presence of our place of dwelling, and the recognizable identities of our friends.” 65
Dewey explains the appearance of permanence by distinguishing two forms of change,
“process” and “structure.” A process of change can most easily be classified as rapid and
unsteady change. For example, if one were to set a match to a sheet of paper, the paper rapidly
burns and changes into another state. The burning of paper does not occur necessarily or
regularly, it is an irregular event. Structure on the other hand, is sustained and regular change
over a long period of time. This change may not be recognizable to the human eye. For
example, from our prospective on earth, we see the sun burning, millions of miles away,
seemingly unchanged since the beginning of recorded history. However, we now know, through
scientific inquiry, that in fact, the sun is changing. Daily the sun burns off unimaginable energy,
steadily weakening itself until one day there is no fuel left to burn and the sun is no more. This is
structural change, consistent change over long periods of time. Furthermore, structure serves as a
framework in Dewey’s philosophy. Robert E. Dewey argues it serves a similar role to substance,
in that structure provides a framework, though not permanent, upon which events can take
place 66. The structure of the Sun keeps it in relative consistency and allows for process changes
to occur. Dewey uses the example of a house.
A set of traits is called structure, because of its limiting function in relation to other traits of
events. A house has a structure; in comparison with the disintegration and collapse that would
occur without its presence, this structure is fixed. Yet it is not something external to which the
changes involved in building and using the house have to submit. It is rather an arrangement of
changing events such that properties, which change slowly, limit and direct a series of quick
65
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changes and give them an order, which they do not otherwise possess. Structure is constancy of
means, of things used for consequences, not of things taken by themselves or absolutely. 67

This is nothing short of a brilliant move by Dewey, for it allows him to speak of change while
still maintaining a structure upon which other changes can take place and be understood. The
Greek response to this world of change was to construct elaborate metaphysical systems that
promised permanence and stability (and unconscious psychological relief) in the face of change
and insecurity. Dewey, on the other hand, can maintain change at all levels without sacrificing
our ability to know the world and without appeal of otherworldly phenomena.

2.3.2 Substance
Dewey’s metaphysics of change has consequences for the traditions view of substance.
Robert E. Dewey writes, “Dewey’s conception of structure stands in his philosophy as a correlate
to the traditional notion of substance in at least one sense, namely, the sense in which substance
is conceived as that which remains constant throughout change.” 68 This statement needs further
explanation however, for there should be no confusion that Dewey does not adhere to classical
notions of substance or essence. Philosophers of substance (Aristotle, Descartes, etc) argue for
permanence outside the realm of experience that remains throughout change. Dewey recognizes
this as an error because it assumes substance without empirical evidence. Rather, our senses
demonstrate a world of impermanence and change. What appears to be permanent is merely the
objects structure, which itself undergoes constant change.
To further demonstrate how Dewey’s structure and process differs from traditional
notions of matter and form; which in turn is analogous to the subject-object distinction, in which
matter represents that which is objectified, while the form of the matter serves to define and
classify the matter, let us follow Robert E. Dewey in comparing Aristotle to Dewey. First, there
67
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does appear to be similarities between the two views. For Aristotle, matter and form were not
separate entities apart from the individual, rather they must be taken together, one cannot have
matter without form and vice versa. Likewise, Dewey does not see structure and process as
separate entities, but rather structure serves to collect, organize, and arrange processes. You
cannot have structure without the processes to form it, nor can you have processes without
structural organization. Robert Dewey argues that it is the necessary co-constitution of both
Aristotelian matter-form and Deweyan structure-process that allows both to avoid the difficulties
of their predecessors.
By virtue of making these distinctions in the way they do, both philosophers are
able to avoid problems which arise in other systems. In Aristotle’s case, there is
no need to deal with the unsolved Platonic problem of how forms are related to
matter. In Dewey’s case, there is no need to explain how uniformities of structure
can be combined with events in perpetual flux. Neither matter and form, nor
structure and process, refer to separately existing parts. By the nature of the case,
they cannot be treated as though they were building blocks, which must be put
together. Hence, no problem of their joining arises. 69
However, it is here that the differences end. Dewey’s natural empiricism allows him to escape
from the Aristotle’s individual and thus avoids difficulties in relating one individual to another.
Rather, for Dewey everything in nature is deeply interconnected, so much so that one thing can
never be said to be separate from another. 70 Therefore, where Aristotle began with individuals
and then relied on the metaphysical notion of a fixed essence to relate these individuals to
family, genes, species, etc, Dewey’s philosophy allows him to identify interconnectedness
without appeal to metaphysical notions.
Furthermore, Aristotle examines entities outside of contextual problems or concerns. If
everything has an essence determining it’s proper being, and this essence is unchanging, than one
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can examine any entity in any context because that which makes the entity what it is transcends
context. In contrast, Dewey argues that because everything in nature is affected by everything
else, structure must be understood strictly within the context in which it is studied. Take for
example a Dog. Aristotle would argue one can begin with the individual dog, and because this
dog shares its essence with other dogs, one can extrapolate the findings in the individual to the
totality of dog-hood. For Dewey, one can study the structure of the dogs eating patterns, his
skeletal structure, his propensity to defecate on the carpet; but these structures must always be
understood in the problematic context in which they are investigated. This is because the dog is
not a thing per se, but a complex structure of events. “No one set of characteristics constitutes
the structure of the complex.” 71 The constitutions of structure differ depending on the context in
which it is placed. The bone structure may be understood as holding the body together in one
context, while in another context the bone structure may play a different role. There is no
essence unifying every instance, only contextual relevance and change.
As we have seen with the prior comparison with Aristotle, Dewey turns to the tradition to
critique the notion of substance, as well as its natural offspring, subjectivism. Dewey argues
that the roots of subjectivism can be traced as far back as ancient philosophy. “In approaching
the exaggerations of individual mind found in modern philosophy which go by the name of
subjectivism and a large part of what is termed idealism, we may profitably recur to ancient
thought” 72 The ancients, operating under metaphysical assumptions, assumed that every human
institution is derived out of the natural law and therefore cannot be usurped or replaced. One
cannot stand against religion because religion is a result of nature. The institution is nature and as
such reflects nature’s metaphysically fixed and permanent state, thus it became the individual
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who is set over and against nature and its institutions. 73 Dewey points to this movement as the
historical beginnings of, what Heidegger calls, the subject-object distinction, the fact that the
individual is wholly autonomous, over and above everything else. Subjectivity becomes more
engrained in the tradition through the Middle Ages, with “the conspicuous assertion…that the
individual soul is the ultimate end and ultimate subject of salvation or damnation…” 74
Thus, the ancient and medieval tradition lays the foundation for modernity to complete
isolate the subject from his environment. So while Descartes thought he was shaking the
philosophical ground of previous institutions, and developing radical new ideas, he in fact was so
blinded by the tradition in which he found himself that he only manages to complete the
subjective isolation the tradition had begun. Wholesale revolt against tradition led to the illusion
of equally whole isolation of mind as something wholly individual. Revolting and reforming
thinkers like Descartes little noted how much of tradition they repeated and perpetuated in their
very protest and reforms.” 75 One cannot help but be struck by the irony; Descartes put the final
nail the metaphysical construction of the subject by trying to reform the tradition out of which
subjectivity arose. While trying to escape the tradition, Descartes became its servant.

2.4 Dewey and Science
Dewey is such a proponent of science and its methods that he thinks the scientific method
should be employed in every range of inquiry. It is now clear that Dewey’s critique of
metaphysics is informed from his knowledge of science, particularly Darwinian evolution.
However, as Robert E. Dewey observes, the entirety of Dewey’s philosophical thought is
grounded in the scientific knowledge of his day, so much so that “When historians of the future
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seek to find the authors whose works best express the spirit of new movements in their time, they
are bound to note that, to the thinkers of several generations in America, John Dewey as the
spokesman of science.” 76 The following provides an examination of how Dewey’s metaphysical
thought is directly influenced by his metaphysics.
Dewey’s critique of substance is derived from science. Evolution holds living thing on
the plant evolved to adjust to its environment. Thus, the human species, at its most basic and
fundamental level, is merely reacting to his surroundings. 77 The result of this scientifically
informed world-view is nothing less than the collapse of subjectivity, based upon the idea of “a
self contained mind standing outside nature and observing its processes like a non-participating
spectator.” 78 Thus, humanity does not hold a lofty perch above lower life forms, but all forms of
nature, including humans, arose from the same processes and ultimately out of the same cosmic
stardust. One can see that it was a strict adherence to scientific knowledge that allowed Dewey
to abandon the egocentric, metaphysically based view of subjectivity.
Furthermore, as we have already observed, Dewey finds ammunition for his critique of the
tradition as metaphysical through the science of psychology. However, even the psychological
state of our species is inseparable from the stimulus-response environmental model of Darwian
evolution of biology. Therefore, without repeating the psychological critique of metaphysics,
one recognizes that Dewey sees science as revealing to contemporary man not only what
metaphysical thought is, but also where and why it arose.
One cannot separate Dewey’s deconstruction of metaphysics from his knowledge of
science. With metaphysics out of the picture, an epistemological gap emerges, thus creating a
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problematic situation that requires resolution, and it is the role of science to fill the
epistemological gap and solve the problem. The scientific discoveries of Dewey’s time,
particularly the epoch shifting discoveries of Darwin, provided the evidence of change upon
which Dewey builds. Furthermore, Darwin laid the groundwork for Dewian Instrumentalism, by
knocking humanity off of its self-constructed pedestal of superiority, and placing him back into
the natural environment, so much so that one cannot be said to be separate from the surrounding
environment. This move destroyed the metaphysics of substance and the subject-object
dichotomy. For one cannot be inseparably molded by his surroundings while maintaining a split
between oneself and his environment. Also, by turning to the science of psychology, Dewey
provides a historical account of why metaphysics arose, thus providing a necessary explanation
for its existence, for if one cannot account for why metaphysics exists in history one is justified
in assuming that metaphysicians simply grasp reality. Clearly then, one can see that it is science
that directly influenced Dewey’s critique of metaphysics.
Nonetheless, despite an ontology that emphasis the interconnection between the self and
the environment, there is much controversy as to how Dewey’ instrumentalism intends for the
environment to be used. Dewey identified his philosophy as both “instrumentalism” and
“naturalism”, two terms that appear to be in sharp contrast to one another. However, upon closer
investigation, one sees that no such contrast exists. For Dewey, the environment is the totality of
actions and inquiry, one cannot use the “environment” per se, it is far too broad and complicated.
However, one can use particular aspects of one’s surroundings as instruments for adaptation. For
example, one can use coal to heat homes. Thus, Dewey’s naturalism and instrumentalism
dovetail nicely, one is part of the complex environment while still managing to use aspects of
one’s surroundings to adapt to that environment.
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At first glance, a philosophy by which nature is free to be used and manipulated may
seem to contradict Dewey’s original premise of interconnection. However, this is not the case.
For, as Dewey sees it, one evolved “in and of” a specific environment in which there is a
continuous sharing of reactions and adaptations. To exist is to adapt, and thus without any
conscious interaction with the environment, one is both affecting his surroundings and being
affected by his surroundings. Thus, to use nature as an instrument is not a violation of nature’s
sovereignty, but merely the conscious acceptance of what is already the case, namely adaptation.
One is already using, as well as being used by, the environment simply through existing,
therefore to control stable aspects of one's surroundings toward altering the larger environment
toward the improvement of the total experience in that environment is natural.
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CHAPTER 3: COMPARING DEWEY AND HEIDEGGER
Now that we have an understanding of both Dewey and Heidegger’s views concerning
metaphysics and its relationship to science, it is time to compare the two thinkers philosophies in
order to etch out their similarities and differences, to see if a reconciliation is possible between
their obviously divergent views on science, and if not, to finally endorse one view over the other.
There are two main areas in which Dewey and Heidegger’s philosophies’ share
similarities; the historical emergence of metaphysics and the traditional view of substance as
metaphysical. These two areas of thought are essential to understanding, not only the similarities
and differences between the two thinkers, but also because it is out of these areas that their
philosophy of science emerges. One cannot know Dewey’s view on science until one knows his
critique of substance, nor can one know Heidegger’s critique of science until one sees the
subject-object distinction. Nor can one understand these notions without understanding their
historical emergence. Once we have evaluated these two areas of similarity, we shall attempt to
recognize why such similar views lead to divergent conclusions about the role of science, in
other words, with all the same ingredients, why does two different cakes emerge.

3.1 The Tradition
“There is, however, an obvious way of distinguishing critics of the tradition like Dewey
and Heidegger from the amateur, the philistine, the mystic, or the belletrist. This is the depth and
extent of their commentary on the details of the tradition.”79
-Richard Rorty
The first area of comparison between Dewey and Heidegger regards their philosophy
concerning the tradition. While neither is the first to actively engage the tradition in their
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philosophy (Hegel for example, proceeds both) there is little doubt about the importance the
emergence of prior philosophies plays in both thinkers.
Clearly, both recognize the emergence of metaphysics as a symptom, a misrepresentation
of the truth of reality, the philosophical equivalent of original sin, committed by forefathers,
reinforced overtime and tradition, and finally delivered to us, naive and ignorant. Both insist on
staring into our past to discover our present condition. Richard Rorty argues that it is the
philosophers need to study his tradition that distinguishes philosophers from other disciplines. 80
For, it is truly a rarity for a philosopher to emerge out of the tradition with wholly original
insights, when he does emerge, the philosophical community creates a school of thought around
the original insight, study it, analyze it, poke and prod it from every angle, until the original
thought is swept up into the philosophical cannon, becoming itself a part of history.
Philosophers, for the most part, are the carriers of the tradition, identifying themselves with the
verb form of other thinker’s surnames (i.e. I am a Kantian, I am an Aristotelian, I am a
Heideggerian, etc). Yet, it is a rare few who, while recognizing the importance of the tradition,
want to tear it down and start anew. Both Heidegger and Dewey realized that the tradition must
be overcome, if philosophy is ever going to advance beyond its metaphysical foundations.
Heidegger sees the emergence of metaphysics as a linguistic movement after the original
misunderstanding of the ontological difference, only to be further perpetuated by religious
tradition and otherworldliness. The misrepresentation of Being and the shift to metaphysics
becomes so infused in our history that our language begins to reflect it, and when one’s language
itself becomes immersed in metaphysics, the language, as well as the tradition from which it
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sprang, must be overcome. 81 This desire to rip down the established linguistic tradition, with its
inherent metaphysical leanings, explains Heidegger’s seemingly strange terminology and style of
writing. For example, Heidegger does not speak of man as a subject, as the tradition has
presupposed, but rather redefines man as Dasein, translated as “there-being” and representing
Heidegger’s ontology of fundamental orientation in the world.
Dewey on the other hand, sees the tradition in a more psychological mode, arguing that
metaphysics was Homo sapiens way to make sense of a nonsensical universe. Metaphysics
provides solidity and comfort, permanence and final ends, which console those who did not have
the modern tools for understanding the cosmos. The human mind evolved to loathe the
unexplained, search for answers, even when no answer is available, and to make up solutions to
the best of one’s capacity, even when these answers are metaphysical and wrong.
So, we now see that both philosophers placed a great deal of emphasis on the tradition, in
order to defeat metaphysics. I contend that if one is to deconstruct metaphysics, the tradition is
the only place to turn. Metaphysics had to come from somewhere, it either reflects a true
metaphysical reality or it popped out of someone’s head. Both Heidegger and Dewey know that
metaphysics must be over come in terms of the tradition. For, if one is to analyze metaphysics
upon metaphysical grounds, one admits to the existence of metaphysics. If one argues that
metaphysics emerges from our knowledge of God, than one admits to the already metaphysical
concept of God. No, too know the origins of metaphysics without presupposing the truth of
metaphysics; one must turn to the tradition as the only source of its emergence.
Both Heidegger and Dewey recognize this, however, if one were to read each philosopher
through the eyes of the other, one sees that both would classify the other as a benefactor of the
81
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tradition. For example, Richard Rorty argues that Heidegger would see Dewey as attempting to
overcome the tradition while still enframed by the traditions metaphysical language. “For
Heidegger, Dewey’s sketches of the history of philosophy are, at best, pathetic examples of the
futility of attempting to overcome metaphysics by using the vocabulary of metaphysics (e.g.,
‘experience’ and ‘nature’)” 82 On the other hand, Dewey would read Heidegger’s view of the
tradition as “academic parochialism.” 83 Rorty writes about the Deweyan view of Heidegger,
“Who but a philosophy professor, after all, would think that the drama of twentieth-century
Europe had some essential relation to the ‘Vollendung der Metaphysik.’” 84 That is to say, while
Heidegger sees Dewey as trapped in the traditions metaphysical language, Dewey sees
Heidegger as a typical academic, over stating the importance of his own profession in shaping
the direction of the world.
Furthermore, the later Heidegger’s turn toward mystical prose about the “four-fold” of
“earth, sky, divinity, and mortals” is exactly the kind of spiritual otherworldliness that Dewey
rejects throughout the tradition. Indeed, I agree with Rorty in reading Heidegger as still
dependent upon the tradition that he desires to overcome. That, in fact, the whole of Heidegger’s
philosophy depends upon the traditions metaphysical use of language. For, it is only through
negation, the demonstration of where the tradition went wrong, does the ontological difference
gain any strength.
“Heidegger’s

attachment to the notion of ‘philosophy’- the pathetic notion that
even after metaphysics goes, something called ‘Thought’ might remain-is simply
the sign of Heidegger’s own fatal attachment to the tradition: the last infirmity of
the greatest of the German professors. It amounts to saying that even though
everybody who has previously counted as a paradigm of philosophy – Plato,
Thomas, Descartes, Nietzsche- turned out to be a step on a path toward chaos, we
must still try to be philosophers…No matter how much Heidegger seems to have
overcome our professional urge to compete with the great dead philosophers on
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their own ground, no matter how much he may try to distance himself from the
tradition…he is still insistent that the tradition offered us ‘words of being”…The
whole force of Heidegger’s though lies in his account of the history of
philosophy” 85

Dewey on the other hand, sees the tradition mostly as a failure that should be wholly abandoned.
Rather the emphasis of philosophy should turn from metaphysically informed attempts at
epistemology, toward socially conscious analysis of society and behavior, through science, for
the betterment of humanity. Of course, Heidegger would respond that Dewey has wrongly placed
his focus upon beings (i.e. the environment, science and its desire to categorize and classify)
rather than the true path of philosophical inquiry, being itself.
In any case, both thinkers recognize metaphysics, with its linguistic emergence in
Heidegger and its psychological emergence in Dewey, as the assumptions of the past, reinforced
through control structures which themselves depend up metaphysics for their very existence. For
example, the structures of the church throughout the middle ages enforced a strict metaphysical
dependence. Even when a thinker, like Descartes, attempts to radically question the assumptions
of the establishment, he still, consciously or unconsciously, acknowledges the establishment’s
metaphysics.
Heidegger and Dewey both turn their historical eye to Descartes, and the fact that two,
seemingly unconnected philosophers would both choose Descartes, out of the many figures in
the tradition, speaks not only to the similarity in their thought concerning the tradition but also
illuminates the powerful metaphysical authority that Descartes preside over.
Dewey sees the tradition as advancement, throwing off previously unfounded
metaphysical concepts for new scientific worldview. This is no surprise considering Dewey’s
Hegelian training. Heidegger sees the tradition as devolution, becoming more and more
85
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enframed by the control of mathematics and technology, as well as our misunderstanding of
being. This difference between the two thinkers stands as one of the biggest points of departure
when they turn from metaphysics to science. If one were to view the tradition through Dewey’s
eyes, one sees modern science, with its refusal to accept pre-established dogmas and its emphasis
on method, as an unquestionable advancement over “classical science.” In fact, Dewey points to
the overcoming of metaphysical classification and categorization as one of the benchmarks of
modern science. Heidegger on the other hand, sees the rise of modern science as a symptom of a
much larger issue, namely the misunderstanding of being. Heidegger tells us, “With these three
characteristics of modern science, that it is a factual, experimental, measuring science, we still
miss the fundamental characteristic of modern science. The fundamental feature must consist in
what rules and determines the basic movement of science itself.” 86 The “fundamental feature”
that Heidegger is referring is mathematics, which, by its very nature, organizes and classifies that
toward which it is directed. Heidegger argues science, at its very essence, is mathematical and
therefore metaphysical. Nor did mathematics merely popup at the foundations of science, but
has its roots in the tradition, particularly Descartes.

3.2 Substance and Subjectivity
The second area of comparison is substance and subjectivity. When thinking of
metaphysics, most would probably not think of substance. After all, it seems to be true of our
pre-philosophical intuition that one is not the same as the other; the dog is not his owner, the
chair is separate from its surroundings, etc. Both Heidegger and Dewey recognized such beliefs
as grounded in the metaphysical tradition that separates a subject from objects through the
creation of the concept of substance.
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The metaphysical notion of substance is of something fixed and unchanging that defines
the subject and places him or her in sharp contrast to other objects, which have different
substances.

As we have seen, Dewey’s instrumentalism and Heidegger’s phenomenology both

reject substance. For Dewey, the notion of anything fixed and permanent is contrary to all
epistemological evidence; the only thing one can be certain about is that things change. For
Heidegger, the notion of substance reflects the traditional misinterpretation of being as noun
rather than verb. In Being and Time, Heidegger redefines man, not as a substance or subject that
is, but rather as Dasein, or There-Being, purposefully reflecting Dasein’s being as an action.
Dasein is because Dasein is literally doing something, is literally there within the world. Dewey
reflects this exact sentiment in his natural empiricism, with its emphasis on the stimulus-response
model.
Descartes serves as the perfect illustration for both thinkers philosophy of subjectivity.
Rorty tells us, “Heidegger’s claim, in Being and Time, that the neglect of Zuhandensein lies
behind the Cartesian problem of the existence of the external world parallels Dewey’s reiterated
claim that ‘the brood and nest of dualisms’ which appeared in the seventeenth century was due to
the initial split between the enduring object of contemplation and the malleable objects of the
artisan.” 87 Both thinkers see the establishment of the cogito as the acumination of a metaphysical
tradition that insists on classification and separation. Nor can Heidegger’s phenomenology and
Dewey’s instrumentalism accept an ontology that insists on separating one from the world.
Rather, both insist on a philosophy that not merely includes a subject within a world of objects,
but obliterates the concept on subjectivity and substance in favor of a wholly interrelated and
interdependent existence, for both thinkers, one’s relationship to the environment is primary, to
the point that the subject is indistinguishable from the world. Both thinkers recognize the
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consequences of the metaphysical concept of substance as creating a subject-object split and
therefore a path toward objectification.
While both thinkers view subjectivity and substance as arising out of the metaphysical
assumptions of the tradition, they disagree around some key areas. For example, as we have
seen both thinkers recognize the subject-object distinction, however, they draw different
conclusions from the distinction. Heidegger sees the objectification of the world through the
creation of the subject as another means of control; a reduction of one’s environment to
egocentrism, whereby everything that is not the subject is available to be interpreted and
manipulated according to the subjects whim. Clearly, this is not a positive movement; rather
Heidegger sees it as detrimental to our ontological standing in the world.
In contrast, Dewey does not see the subject-object distinction in the same terms. While it
is true Dewey recognizes objectification as a symptom of metaphysical subjectivity, he does not
see the control structure against which Heidegger rebels. Rather, one’s environment is
something to be controlled and manipulated, if only for the betterment of humanity. This places
Dewey in direct contradiction to Heidegger, and seems to require a defense of Dewey against
Heidegger.
Dewey’s recognition of the subject-object split is a fundamental problem, because, like
Heidegger, Dewey’s ontology is one of deep interconnection to the world, and objectification
destroys this primary state. However, for Dewey the environment is as much manipulating
oneself as one is manipulating it. There is such a level of codependence that one cannot be said
to fully manipulate his surroundings without simultaneously manipulating himself. For example,
when one clear-cuts a forest, one has manipulated the environment, thus creating a situation, a
stimulus that the human person must respond to, emotionally, mentally, or physically.
Therefore, there is never simply action against objects; rather the environment simultaneously
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affects the “subject”. Thus, the use of nature, through science, for the advancement and
betterment of mankind is not a result of objectifications as Heidegger argues. Rather, science,
and its relationship to nature, is a means to transform the world for the better. As Dewey writes,
“Nature as it already exists ceases to be something which must be accepted and submitted to,
endured and enjoyed just as it is. It is now something to be modified, to be intentionally
controlled. It is material to act upon so as to transform it into new objects which better answer
our needs.” 88 This view is a direct result of Dewey’s deconstruction of subjectivity.
The differences between the two thinkers is clear on this point, one either embraces the
Deweyan model and sees the deconstruction of subjectivity as a licenses to manipulate the
environment, or one is with Heidegger and sees any form of manipulation of the environment as
metaphysical, resulting in objectification and subjectivity and therefore ought to be overcome.
Both men deny the notion of subjectivity as an archaic metaphysical notion that results in
objectification and control. However, Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity and substance is so
deep, so fundamental and complete; that it appears to undercuts even Dewey’s philosophy. For
example, where Heidegger encourages an ecological view in which one immerses himself in his
“world” wholly, so that the “ready-at-hand” experience is primary and preferred. Dewey on the
other hand, wants man to emerge above his environment, not so much to be separated, for that is
impossible, but to gain perspective on his role within it. Yet, this temporary separation from the
environment appears to contradict Dewey’s deconstruction of subjectivity. For if one is to
elevate oneself through the use and manipulation of the environment, there remains a
fundamental acceptance of a subject, that is, of an I who is using that for such and such a
purpose. Yet, this is only an apparent contradiction, in truth; Dewey’s instrumentality only can
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emerge after the I is defeated. There is a self, adapting and using his surroundings, yet there is
no substance defining or separating that self from his environment. Human consciousness may
have evolved to the point that we can now take stock of our situation, but this in no way
produces a subject in the traditional sense. Man is a part of nature ontologically, in his very
being, that is, to exist is to be interrelated to one’s world.
Thus, Dewey circumvents this criticism by arguing that there is no real separation
because adaptation occurs to the self at the same time that the self uses the tools of the
environment. To which Heidegger would respond that mankind’s manipulation of the
environment far exceeds the environments reciprocation. That while we build power plants on
rivers, it is ultimately the discloser of the river that is manipulated, changed, and controlled; that
the rivers discloser is fundamentally altered through the technology mankind erects. The
revelation of being has been affected, not through the environments own devises, but rather the
new discloser has be forced upon it. Yet, both see the death of the subject as introducing a new
perspective of technology, one of fundamental interaction, free from subjective separation.

3.3 Science
What we have seen is that the most significant difference between Heidegger and Dewey
in regards to science as it relates to metaphysics is the significance placed upon science. For
Dewey, it is science that dictates the overcoming of metaphysics, while for Heidegger it is the
overcoming of metaphysics that drives his views of science. Dewey saw science as the
foundation and deconstructed metaphysics in its name. Heidegger saw the onto-ontological
distinction as the foundation and thus places science in the same vain as metaphysics.
However, it should come as no surprise that some similarities emerge between the two’s
scientific views. First, they are similar when evaluating the role of philosophy against science.
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As Rorty point out, both thinkers believe that there must be a separation between the functions of
philosophy and science. “When they discuss the relation between philosophy and science, both
men see Cartesian, Husserlian, and positivistic attempts to ‘make philosophy scientific’ as a
disastrous abandonment of philosophy’s proper function.” 89 Both maintain that philosophy is not
the opponent of science, competing for the most accurate epistemological vision of the world,
but rather it is the role of philosophy to clear “away what impedes our delight, not as the
discovery of a correct representation of reality.” 90 In other words, it is not philosophies role to
unravel the movements of celestial bodies, rather that is the proper place of science.
Dewey sees the ancient worldview as relying upon a fixed and certain reality. Of course,
as we have seen such a desire for permanence and fixity resulted from man’s psychological need
to make sense out of a senseless universe. We have also seen the Dewey recognizes finite
permanence as metaphysical and historical. He argues that this changes as we move into the
modern period. In fact, Dewey sees this movement from metaphysical permanence to
scientifically informed change as one of the distinguishing marks of modernity and, no doubt, as
an advancement over the ancient world view. 91
Heidegger disagrees with Dewey’s assessment. Where Dewey sees part of the
advancement of science over metaphysics as the abandonment of concepts for experiment,
Heidegger points out that, if viewed merely as the overcoming of concepts and observation, there
is no difference between ancient and modern science. 92 Writing, “The contrast between the
ancient and the modern attitude toward science cannot therefore be established by saying, there
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concepts and principles, and here are facts.” 93 Furthermore, Heidegger would not accept
Dewey’s argument that modern science is set apart through an emphasis on experimentation.
Rather, Heidegger argues that our worldview is becoming more fixed and “mathematical” as a
result of our emphasis on experimentation. For, according to Heidegger, when one prepares an
experiment, one brings a preconceived “determination of the facts and a way of applying
concepts” 94 This is due to modernity’s need to view everything through the calculating lens of
mathematics, thus establishing a preconceived worldview in which “things” are classified,
calculated, and measured prior to any experience with them. There are no new paths of thought
established through modern science, only the reaffirmation of the old metaphysical desire to
enframe, separate, and objectify; only now it this is done through the guise of mathematics.
Furthermore, Dewey wants philosophy to use science as its grounds of inquiry, tearing
down the assumptions of the previous generations and reconstructing new thought based upon
what science has reviled. Dewey writes, “When this step is taken the circle of scientific
development will be rounded out and the reconstruction of philosophy be made an accomplished
fact.” 95 Heidegger, on the other hand, sees philosophies desire to “measure up” to science as
misguided and ultimately metaphysical. “…Philosophy has been in the constant predicament of
having to justify its existence before the ‘sciences.’ It believes it can do that most effectively by
elevating itself to the rank of science. But such an effort is the abandonment of the essence of
thinking. Philosophy is hounded by the fear that it loses prestige and validity if it is not a
science. Not to be a science is taken as a failing that is equivalent to being unscientific.” 96 These
two views are diametrically opposed and as such can never be reconciled. Either one is with
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Dewey and sees science as the new grounds of philosophical inquiry, or one is with Heidegger
and sees science as an obstacle, metaphysical in nature, that must be overcome for philosophy to
truly come into its own.
Their particular views concerning technology demonstrate, once again, an irreconcilable
difference between the two thinkers. As we have seen, Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is
one in which the “revealing” of the environment is contorted by the “enframing power” of
technology and everything that is not technological is reduced to mere resources for
technological use. Dewey would disagree with Heidegger’s conception of technology, seeing it
as naive and nihilistic. Dewey writes, “there is no greater sign of the paralysis of the imagination
which an involvement in immediate detain can induce, than the belief, sedulously propagated by
some who pride themselves on superior tastes, that the machine is itself the source of our
troubles.” 97 Rather, Dewey would see the proper use of technology as the outcome of scientific
methodology and any misuse of technology as a mistake of mankind, not of technology itself,
arguing, “it is hard to think of anything more childish than the animism which puts the blame on
machinery”
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It is the full use of our natural gifts and can be a means of improvement, not only

for humanity but also for the environment. Thus, I contend that Dewey would be in complete
agreement with Heidegger with regards to technology requiring a “standing reserve” only Dewey
would not see this as bad. Rather, I believe Dewey technology is equally apart of our
environment and as such is involved in our continuous game of adaptation. We are there to
service the Power Station on the Rheine, yet at the same time, the power station serves us by
providing services that doubtlessly improve the quality of our life.
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CONCLUSION
So what are we to conclude from what has been learned? First, our original goal, to see if
the seemingly similar philosophies of Dewey and Heidegger can be reconciled, now seems to be
impossible. Despite quite similar views concerning the traditional emergence of metaphysics
and the destruction of substance and subjectivity, as well as their similar views of primary
correlation with one’s surrounding environment and instrumentality, these similarities emerge
out of principally separate philosophies.
The irreconcilable difference between the two becomes most evident when the discussion
turns to science and technology. Heidegger’s phenomenology explicitly rejects science as being
essentially metaphysical, while Dewey’s natural empiricism is buttressed by the scientific
revelations of the day. Dewey is fully indebted to his time and his philosophy could never have
arisen prior to Darwin and evolutionary theory. Where Heidegger rejects science as
metaphysical, Dewey hails science as the great destroyer of the metaphysical tradition.
So who shall we side with? In truth, neither philosopher fully commits to his philosophy.
Heidegger is wholly indebted to a metaphysical tradition that he desires to overcome. Indeed,
just as Dewey is dependent upon the science of his time, Heidegger too could never have
developed his philosophy without the misunderstanding of the ontological difference in the
tradition. Page upon page of Heidegger is dedicated to demonstrating how words reflect a
metaphysical essence. Remember Heidegger does not wish to complete destroy metaphysics,
though he argues traditional metaphysics is incorrect, but to incorporate the history into a new
path of thinking. As Rorty writes, “Heidegger’s sense of the vulgarity of the age-its trivialization
of everything holy- is strongest when what is trivialized is the history of metaphysics. For this
history is the history of Being, and to make that history into a useful lesson for modern man is to
make Being itself an instrument for our employment and an object of exploitation…to treat the
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great philosophers as stepping stones, or to choose among them as we choose our favorite
pictures, is to make a mockery of Being itself.” 99 Thus, without the metaphysical tradition,
Heidegger’s philosophy would be flat mysticism; without his critique of the tradition as evidence
of the misunderstanding of being, Heidegger’s ontology would probably closer resemble
Dewey’s; striped down, bare bones instrumentality. Heidegger wishes to critique the tradition as
a misunderstanding, yet wishes to use this misunderstanding as a tool for his philosophy.
Heidegger does not fully commit to the overcoming of metaphysics because he needs the
tradition. Heidegger even places himself within the tradition, arguing that his philosophy
resembles the pre-Socratic notion of truth as unconcealment.
Because Heidegger does not wish to fully throw off the metaphysics of the past, he is still
indebted to it and therefore his rejection of science and technology as metaphysical proves to be
incoherent. He sees modern science as having a metaphysical essence and turns against it, yet at
the same time he remains beholden to the metaphysics upon which it is based. To have fully
rejected science and technology, Heidegger would have had to fully reject metaphysics. He does
not and therefore does not fully commit to his own metaphysical critiques.
Dewey, however, fully accepts the rejection of metaphysics. There is no room for fixity
and permanence in his thought, and as such a tradition that searches for such things has
completely missed the point. If one were to do metaphysics in a Deweyan world, it is under a
new definition of metaphysics, one that searches for contingency and change, and therefore does
not resemble the impermeable systems of the past. This rejection of the metaphysical tradition is
perfectly in line with Dewey’s philosophy of science, in fact, it is dependent upon it. Dewey’s
rejection of metaphysics for science seems more honest, or at least more complete than
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Heidegger’s rejection of science as metaphysical. Dewey does not need to cling to a past that he
rejects because he has a replacement for its epistemology, science.
Heidegger would certainly disagree; arguing that Dewey’s willingness to allow for the
manipulation of the environment demonstrates his unwillingness to commit wholly to his own
ontology of interrelation. When one uses science and technology to investigate and manipulate
the environment, one is committed to a philosophy in which one is the objectifer, the subject,
while everything else is merely a reservoir for study and use, or objects. Perhaps there is some
truth to this, that when one studies a fish, one recognizes that the fish is not oneself, that one is a
human, dissimilar to the plants, animals, and minerals that surround him.
Yet, I contend Dewey escapes this criticism. Homo sapiens are, fundamentally, part of
nature, engaged in the continuous process of adaption, stimulus, and response. The metaphysics
of substance and subjectivity sought to separate man from the world by creating the notion that,
despite the change that surrounds us, our personhood, our human essence remains unchanged.
Dewey rejects this, so that now, any stimulus, or action preformed in the environment must be
accompanied by some response, no matter how minute. One cuts down a tree in the forest, one
has manipulated his environment and has likewise responded to that manipulation, albeit the
response is not immediately evident. There is no substance to resist change, thus every change is
ubiquitous.
It is this very notion that allows for Dewey’s philosophy of science and technology to
escape Heidegger’s critique. One is free to prop, prod, study, analyze and use one’s environment
because each affect to the thing simultaneously affects oneself. Each scientific discovery, each
technological advancement, is accompanied by a response, not just for humans, but for the whole
environment.
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Nonetheless, the interconnection of the environment also serves as a caution for our
technological and scientific endeavors. Because our actions to the environment also
fundamentally affect a response in us, we as a species must be mindful of our manipulation of
our surroundings. In a post-metaphysical world, there in nothing preventing change, or nothing
insuring this change is for the better. For, just as the cutting down of a tree for firewood leads to
an environmental response, so the clear cutting of a forest also affects the environment in which
we inhabit, and not necessarily for the better. When we destroy our world, we destroy ourselves.
There is no substance separating us from our affects on the planet, nor are we an autonomous
subject, independent of objects that we use. We, as a species, must be mindful that the
destruction of our environment affects us in a destructive manner.
If there is ever to be reconciliation between Heidegger and Dewey’s views, I believe it is
here, with the knowledge that we are all children in the womb of the earth, forever tied to her
umbilical cord, and that the death of our mother will lead to our stillborn death. The metaphysics
of the past allowed for the excuse that reality was unchanging and fixed, that we could fully
objectify, know it, and control it. Science in the post-metaphysical world does not have such a
privilege, rather the responsibility of care falls directly upon those who wish to use the
environment. Heidegger saw the use of technology as creating a vision of the world in which
everything appeared as a resource, or standing reserve, to feed the technological giants. Dewey
was a champion of technology, yet he certainly would have agreed that, in our modern world, if
we continue to see ourselves in metaphysical terms, as subjects over and against our
surroundings, then eventually we will have exhausted the resources of the environment. The
post-metaphysical world, for both Dewey and Heidegger, is one of stewardship and care for the
world in which we co-dependently reside.

55

REFERENCES
Boisvery, Raymond D. “Dewey’s Metaphysics” (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988)
51
Botha, Catherine Frances. “Heidegger, Technology and Ecology”, South African Journal of
Philosophy (2003), Vol. 22 Issue 2.
Campbell, James. “Understanding John Dewey” (Chicago, Il: Open Court Publishing Company,
1995)
Dewey, John. “Reconstruction in Philosophy” (New York: Dover Publications Inc. 1920, 1948,
2004)
--“The Quest for Certainty” (Southern Illinois University Press., 1984)
--“The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy and other essays in contemporary thought”
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1910)
-- “Experience and Nature” (New York: Dover Publications INC., 1958) 1a
-- “Subject-Matter of metaphysical inquiry” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
Scientific Methods, Vol. 12, No. 13 (Jun. 24 1915)
Dewey, Robert E., “Philosophy of John Dewey,” (the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977) 8-9
(hereafter PJD)
Frank, Philipp. “Metaphysical Interpretations of Science part. 1,” The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science Vol. 1 No. 2, August 1950, 60.
Heidegger, Martin. “The End of Philosophy” (New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973)
-- “Being and Time”, ed. John Macquarie & Edward Robinson (San Francisco, CA:
Harper Collins Publishers, 962)
-- “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco, CA:
Harper Collins Publishers, 1997)
--“Modern Science, Metaphysics, Mathematics,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell
Krell (San Francisco, CA: Harper Collings Publishers, 1993)
-- “The Question Concerning Technology” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell
(San Fransisco, Ca: Harper Collins Publishers 1997)
Kockelmans, Joseph J. “Heidegger and Science” (Lanham, MD: University of America press,
1985)
56

McDonald, Hugh P. “John Dewey and Environmental Philosophy” (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press)
Oakley, Barbara. “Evil Genes,” (New York: Prometheus Books, 2007)
Okrent, Mark. “Heidegger’s Pragmatism: Understanding, Being, and the Critique of
Metaphysics” (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988)
Raffoul, Francois. “Heidegger and the Subject” (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1998)
Rorty, Richard. “Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey,” Review of Metaphysics Vol
XXX No. 2 Issue 118

57

VITA
Michael Dusch was born and raised in Canvas West Virginia. He graduated magna cum laude
from Wheeling Jesuit University in 2006 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in theology and
philosophy.

58

